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Abstract
This paper presents a differentially private algorithm for linear regression learning
in a decentralized fashion. Under this algorithm, privacy budget is theoretically
derived, in addition to that the solution error is shown to be bounded by O(t) for
O(1
t
) descent step size andO(exp(t1−e)) for O( 1
te
) descent step size.
1 Introduction
In recent years, optimization and learning among fully decentralized parties are drawing much atten-
tion Nedic and Ozdaglar [2009], Nedic et al. [2010], Boyd et al. [2011]. However, privacy concerns
are not taken into account in much of the work. Although Huang et al. [2015] presents a private dis-
tributed convex optimizer by incorporating the famous notion of differential privacy Dwork [2011],
too strong boundedness assumptions on the objectives must hold. In this paper, we specify the ob-
jective as the famous least squares, and provide a differentially private decentralized solver, as well
as privacy and accuracy results with relaxed assumptions.
2 Problem Definition
2.1 Decentralized Datasets over Networks
Let V = {1, . . . , k} represent a group of decentralized parties that aim to participate in a global
computational task. As a setup of this paper, the parties in V, termed as nodes, are peer-to-peer
interconnected to locally establish two-way communication, described by edges in a set of unordered
pair of nodes E = {{i, j} : i, j are connected, i, j ∈ V}. Based on the edge set E, one can define
the neighbor set of node i as Ni = {j : {i, j} ∈ E}
⋃ {i}. Over such a network G = (V,E),
which is assumed to be connected throughout this paper, nodes i ∈ V hold mutually exclusive and
homogeneous datasets Di ∈ Rni×m × Rni , respectively, including the design matrixXi ∈ Rni×m
and the label vector yi ∈ Rni . One of the foundational assumptions of this paper is that Di is seen
as privacy by each node i.
33rd Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems (NeurIPS 2019), Vancouver, Canada.
2.2 Existing Decentralized Linear Regression Algorithm
Linear regression is a common model that arises in various disciplines. Consider a design matrix
X ∈ Rn×m and a label vector y ∈ Rn. Then the learning goal of linear regression is to solve the
following least-squares problem:
min
β∈Rm
1
2
‖Xβ − y‖2. (1)
It is well-known that (1) yields a unique optimal estimate β∗ = (X⊤X)−1X⊤y if X has full
column rank. By letting n =
k∑
i=1
ni,X = [X
⊤
1 . . . X
⊤
k ]
⊤ and y = [y⊤1 . . . y
⊤
k ]
⊤, we finally obtain
a decentralized linear regression modelling task (1) over networkG. A fully decentralized algorithm
for solving (1) is described by the following dynamics Nedic et al. [2010]:
βi(t+ 1) =
∑
j∈Ni
wijβj(t)− α(t)∇Li(βi(t)), (2)
where t = 0, 1, 2, . . . is the discretized time, βi(t) is node i’s current estimate towards the global
model, edge weight wij > 0 is defined over j ∈ Ni satisfying wij = wji and
∑
j∈Ni
wij = 1 for
all i ∈ V, α : Z≥0 → R+ is the step size, and Li(β) = 12‖Xiβ − yi‖2. It was proved that if
∞∑
t=0
α(t) = ∞ and lim
t→∞
α(t) = 0, then lim
t→∞
βi(t) = β
∗ for all i ∈ V Liu et al. [2018]. Typical
selections of α(t) include α(t) = c(t+d)e with c, d > 0 and 0 < e ≤ 1. Evidently, the contents
shared among nodes are {βi(t)}i∈V,t∈Z≥0 , which contain the information of ∇Li and thereby Di.
When confronted with global adversaries capable of observing the communication contents, the
algorithm (2) leads to undesirable privacy disclosure. Therefore, a privacy-preserving version of (2)
is demanded.
3 Main Results
In this section, we propose a privacy-preserving version of (2), and provide corresponding differen-
tial privacy and accuracy analysis. To facilitate the presentation of our algorithm, we first introduce
the following assumption.
Assumption 1. All nodes of the network G knows that the optimal estimate β∗ ∈ Rm falls into a
compact and convex set Ω ⊂ Rm with BΩ = sup
β∈Ω
‖β‖.
Note that Assumption 1 is reasonable in the sense that heuristic approaches can be applied to find Ω.
For example, if rank(Xi) = m, each node i can present a convex set Ωi ⊂ Rm containing its local
optimal estimate β∗i = argmin
β∈Rm
Li(β), and Ω can be set as a convex hull of
⋃
i∈V
Ωi. Such methods
are out of scope, and thereby not comprehensively investigated in this paper.
3.1 Privacy-Preserving Algorithm
Define PΩ(β) = inf
β′∈Ω
‖β− β′‖ as the projection onto Ω. Inspired by (2), we provide the following
privacy-preserving linear regression algorithm that terminates in finite time T ≥ 1.
Algorithm 1 T -step Privacy-Preserving Linear Regression
1: Set t← 0 and initialize βi(0) for all i ∈ V.
2: Each node i draws ωi(t) ∈ Rm from the distribution Lapm(v(t)) satisfying lim
t→∞
v(t) = 0.
3: Each node i computes and propagates β♭i (t)← βi(t) + ω(t) to its neighbors j ∈ Ni.
4: Each node i computes the projected state β
♯
i (t)← PΩ(β♭i (t)).
5: Each node i updates its state by βi(t+ 1)←
∑
j∈Ni
wijβ
♯
j(t)− α(t)∇Li(β♯i (t)).
6: Set t← t+ 1. Algorithm terminates if t = T , otherwise go to Step 2.
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As can be noted, under Algorithm 1 each node injects Laplace random noise before true estimate
propagation. After receiving the slightly distorted estimate, each node projects it onto the convex
set containing the optimum to avoid the divergence of learning process.
3.2 Differential Privacy
Now we analyze the differential privacy of Algorithm 1. Relevant notions based on Dwork [2011]
are provided in the following.
Definition 1. Consider two network datasets D = (X,y) and D′ = (X′,y′) in Rn×m × Rn with
n =
k∑
i=1
ni. Then D and D′ are said to be (δX , δy)-adjacent if there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k} such that
(i) ‖Xi‖, ‖X′i‖ ≤ δX and ‖yi‖, ‖y′i‖ ≤ δy; (ii)Xj = X′j and yj = y′j for all j 6= i.
Clearly, the adversaries against Algorithm 1 observe all communication contents among nodes
{β♭i(t)}i∈V,t=0,...,T−1, based on which they aim to infer the privacyD. Such an adversarial relation
can be intrinsically described by a mapping MT : R
n×m × Rn × Rkm → RkmT with
MT (D, {β♭i(0)}i∈V) = {β♭i(t)}i∈V,t=0,...,T−1.
Then the following definition is provided on the differential privacy of Algorithm 1.
Definition 2. Algorithm 1 in T -step preserves ǫ-differential privacy under (δX , δy)-adjacency if for
all R ⊂ RkmT and for all {β♭i(0)}i∈V ∈ Rkm, there holds
Pr(MT (D, {β♭i (0)}i∈V) ∈ R) ≤ eǫ Pr(MT (D′, {β♭i(0)}i∈V) ∈ R)
for all (δX , δy)-adjacent network datasets D,D′ ∈ Rn×m × Rn.
For Algorithm 1, we provide the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Let Assumption 1 hold. Then there exists finite ǫ > 0 such that Algorithm 1 in T -
step preserves ǫ-differential privacy under (δX , δy)-adjacency as T goes to infinity if
{ α(t)
v(t+1)
}∞
t=0
is summable. In particular, if α(t) = cα(t+dα)eα and v(t) =
cv
(t+dv)ev
with cα, eα, cv, ev > 0 and
1 < dv + 1 ≤ dα, then Algorithm 1 in T -step preserves
4δXcαc
−1
v T
√
mnM (δXBΩ
√
km+ δy)
-differential privacy with nM = max{ni : i ∈ V}.
Proof. We will use the compact notation β(t) = [β1(t)
⊤ . . . βk(t)
⊤]⊤ ∈ Rkm for βi(t), and the
same form will also appear for β♭i(t) and β
♯
i(t), whose introduction will be omitted. The underlying
dynamics of Algorithm 1 can be written as
β♭(t+ 1) = (W ⊗ Im)P ∗Ω(β♭(t)) − α(t)G(P ∗Ω(β♭(t))) + ω(t+ 1), (3)
where the ij–th element of W ∈ Rk×k equals wij if j ∈ Ni and zero oth-
erwise, P ∗Ω(β
♭(t)) = [PΩ(β
♭
1(t))
⊤ · · · PΩ(β♭k(t))⊤]⊤, and G(P ∗Ω(β♭(t))) =
[∇L1(PΩ(β♭1(t)))⊤ · · · ∇Lk(PΩ(β♭k(t)))⊤]⊤ = X˜P ∗Ω(β♭(t)) − y˜ with X˜ =
diag(X⊤1 X1, . . . ,X
⊤
k Xk) and y˜ = [y
⊤
1 X1 . . . y
⊤
k Xk]
⊤. Define M (t)(D,β♭(t)) = β♭(t + 1)
such that MT ({β♭i(0)}i∈V) = {M (τ) ◦ · · · ◦M (0) : τ = 0, . . . , T − 1} when omitting D. Then
for any D,D′ differing at node i∗’s dataset w.l.o.g., there hold for all t ≥ 0 based on (3)
Pr(M (t)(D,β♭(t)) = β♭(t+ 1))
Pr(M (t)(D′,β♭(t)) = β♭(t+ 1))
a)
=
pdf(β♭(t+ 1)− (W ⊗ Im)P ∗Ω(β♭(t)) + α(t)G(P ∗Ω(β♭(t))); v(t + 1))
pdf(β♭(t+ 1)− (W ⊗ Im)P ∗Ω(β♭(t)) + α(t)G′(P ∗Ω(β♭(t))); v(t + 1))
b)
≤ exp (α(t)v−1(t+ 1)(‖X˜− X˜′‖1‖P ∗Ω(β♭(t))‖1 + ‖y˜− y˜′‖1))
≤ exp (α(t)v−1(t+ 1)(‖X⊤i∗Xi∗ −X′⊤i∗ X′i∗‖1‖P ∗Ω(β♭(t))‖1 + ‖X⊤i∗yi∗ −X′⊤i∗ y′i∗‖1)), (4)
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where a) is from the Laplace distribution and b) is an application of norm inequalities. Based on
norm inequalities and equivalence Horn and Johnson [2012], one has
‖X⊤i∗Xi∗ −X′⊤i∗ X′i∗‖1 =
∥∥∥∥ [X⊤i∗ −X′⊤i∗ ]
[
Xi∗
X′i∗
] ∥∥∥∥
1
≤ (‖X⊤i∗‖1 + ‖X′⊤i∗ ‖1)(‖Xi∗‖1 + ‖X′i∗‖1)
≤ √mni∗(‖Xi∗‖+ ‖X′i∗‖)2 ≤ 4δ2X
√
mnM .
(5)
Similarly, we have
‖X⊤i∗yi∗ −X′⊤i∗ y′i∗‖1 ≤ 4δXδy
√
mnM . (6)
According to (4), (5) and (6)
Pr(M (t)(D,β♭(t)) = β♭(t+ 1))
Pr(M (t)(D′,β♭(t)) = β♭(t+ 1)) ≤ exp
(
4δX
√
mnM (δXBΩ
√
km+ δy)α(t)v
−1(t+ 1)
)
. (7)
Based on (7) and the composition property McSherry [2009], this proof is completed.
3.3 Accuracy Analysis
Theorem 2. Let Assumption 1 hold. Suppose α(t) = O( 1
teα
) with 0 < eα ≤ 1 and v(t) = O( 1tev )
with ev > 0. Then under Algorithm 1, there holds∑
i∈V
E‖β♭i(t)− β∗‖ =
{
O(t) if eα = 1;
O(exp(t1−eα)) otherwise.
Proof. Wewill continue to use the notations in the proof of Theorem1. Define e(t) = β♭(t)−1⊗β∗.
By subtracting 1⊗ β∗ on both sides of (3), one has
e(t+ 1) = (W ⊗ I− α(t)X˜)e(t) + α(t)(y˜ − X˜(1⊗ β∗)) + ω(t+ 1). (8)
Then it follows (8)
‖e(t+ 1)‖2 ≤ e(t)⊤(W ⊗ I− α(t)X˜)2e(t) + α2(t)‖y˜ − X˜(1⊗ β∗)‖2 + ‖ω(t+ 1)‖2
+ α(t)‖y˜ − X˜(1⊗ β∗)‖‖W ⊗ I− α(t)X˜‖‖e(t)‖+ g(ω(t+ 1)), (9)
where g : Rkm → Rkm is linear. Due to the nonnegativity and irreducibility of W
Horn and Johnson [2012], there holds−1 ≤ ‖W‖ < 1, and thereby ‖W⊗ I−α(t)X˜‖ ≤ 1+α(t).
Then by (9)
E‖e(t+ 1)‖2 = O((1 + α(t))2E‖e(t)‖2 + α(t)(1 + α(t))‖e(t)‖ + α2(t) + v2(t))
= O(((1 + α(t))E‖e(t)‖ + α(t))2 + v2(t)),
which further leads to
E‖e(t+ 1)‖ = O((1 + α(t))E‖e(t)‖ + α(t) + v(t))
= O
( t∏
τ=0
(1 + α(τ)) +
t∑
τ=0
(α(τ) + v(τ))
t∏
κ=τ+1
(1 + α(κ))
)
= O
(
exp
( t∑
τ=0
α(τ)
)
+
t∑
τ=0
(
α(τ) + v(τ)
)
exp
( t∑
κ=τ+1
α(κ)
))
. (10)
It is a fact
t∑
τ=t′
1
τe
= O( ∫ t
t′−1
1
τe
dτ
)
for all t ≥ t′ > 1. Based on (10), one has
E‖e(t+ 1)‖ =


O
(
t+ t
t∑
τ=0
α(τ) + v(τ)
τ
)
if eα = 1;
O
(
exp(t1−eα) + exp(t1−eα)
t∑
τ=0
α(τ) + v(τ)
exp(τ1−eα)
)
otherwise.
(11)
Clearly, both
∞∑
τ=0
α(τ)+v(τ)
τ
and
∞∑
τ=0
α(τ)+v(τ)
exp(τ1−eα) are convergent, the proof is completed by (11).
4
4 Conclusions
In this paper, a differentially private decentralized algorithm for linear regression was proposed.
Not only a theoretic privacy budget was provided, but the precision was carefully investigated and
shown to be bounded byO(t) orO(exp(t1−e)). Future work includes the tradeoff analysis between
efficiency and privacy, and the relaxation of the projection operation.
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